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THE PERENNIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND REALPOLITIK
M. Cherif Bassiouni*
If societies, like human beings, had a genetically-imprinted
survival instinct, it would be the "rule of law." But even in the age of
globalization, our instinct for social survival has not reached such a
developed level.
The putative instinct of social survival cannot be biologically
demonstrated, but historical empirical evidence points in that
direction. History records that a legal system has existed in every one
of the 40 or so world civilizations over the past 7,000 years.
Admittedly, the existence of law and legal institutions does not attest
to the quality of justice attained in these civilizations. However,
evident in every one of these civilizations is the constant struggle for
the pursuit of power and wealth by some to the detriment of others.
This struggle yields inequities and injustices that law and legal
institutions have seldom successfully redressed. But whenever justice
or equity has prevailed, it has been because of law and legal
institutions-and almost always because persons dedicated to the law
pursued such an outcome. Such persons generally encountered
* Professor Bassiouni is the Distinguished Research Professor of Law and
International Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul University College of Law. This
the basis for Professor Bassiouni's speech on March 14, 2006, as part of the
Distinguished Lecture Series at Georgia State University College of Law. For more
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obstacles from power-holders and the proponents of power-interests.
The pursuit of justice has never been easy, and all too frequently the
power-holders and the servants of power-interests have prevailed,
even over elementary fairness and basic rights.
In the last 50 years, national legal systems have qualitatively
advanced far more than during the preceding 7,000 years. This
advance is largely due to the impact of international human rights
norms on national legislation. The concept of the rule of law and all
that it comports-substantive and procedural norms and rules-has
not only enhanced the attainability of justice, but it has contributed to
the harmonization between national legislation and legal processes.
To some extent, this permeation of international human rights norms
and standards has also occurred in the international legal system.
The international and national legal systems differ with respect to
participants, processes, structures, values, goals, decision-making
processes, and above all, enforcement mechanisms and capabilities.
More particularly, the international legal system, is essentially based
on voluntariness and cooperation and therefore, lacks both effective
enforcement deriving from collective decision-making and
institutional capabilities to carry out enforcement. These problems
are particularly apparent with respect to international criminal justice.
Reduced to its basics, what motivates states in their relations is not
enduring values like those that bind human beings, but interests
whose significance and timeliness are in constant flux. Thus, the
dominant feature of interstate relations is by state interests.
Nevertheless, the evolution of interstate and international relations
since World War II (WWII)-until now defined by the Westphalian
concept of sovereignty and the Hegelian concept of state interest
bridled only by prudence and good judgment-indicates that a
significant change has occurred. This change is characterized by
commonly-shared values that transcend the unilateral pursuit and
preservation of power and wealth that are now part of the global
equation. This result is reflected in the many changes that have
occurred in the international legal system in the 20th century,
particularly with respect to multilateral decision-making and
limitations on state sovereignty deriving from commonly-shared
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values and interests. As a result of these changes, the international
legal system now includes the concept of international criminal
accountability for the commission of certain international crimes as
well as the emerging concept of the duty to protect as a harmpreventing measure. These concepts are separate and apart from the
United Nations collective security system. Furthermore, both
international criminal accountability and the duty to protect partake
of the same commonly-shared values and interests. If nothing else,
protection is a means of prevention, as is accountability with respect
to its deterrent effect. Indeed, criminal accountability promotes
advances in international human rights protection because, at a
minimum, victims' rights include bringing their perpetrators to
justice. This link is evident in the General Assembly's adoption in
March of 2006 of the Basic Principlesand Guidelines on the Right to
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, which includes a duty to prosecute.
However, that modest accomplishment took 20 years to get states to
approve these Basic Principles and Guidelines, in large part because
of the duty to prosecute. As the United Nation's Independent Expert
who prepared this text between 1998 and 2002, I can attest to the
obduracy of state interests even at this time, and even for such
fundamental principles. Thus, what the international community is
willing to profess is not necessarily what it is willing to act upon, let
alone enforce.
The identification, application, and enforcement of commonlyshared values and interests in the international legal system
presupposes the existence of a community that postulates certain
universal objects and moral imperatives that require inter alia certain
actions, while proscribing others. It is therefore necessary to identify
the limits of state action and to thresholds that impel them to
cooperate in the common interest. This proposition is not moralistic,
because common experience teaches, based on the lessons of justified
pragmatic considerations, that enlightened self-interest, and prudent
judgment require limits on unilateral state-action and requirements
compelling collective state cooperation for a common interest or a
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common good. The acceptance of the above is not dependent on the
existence or even the desirability of a world government.
Various models of international governance hypothesize an
international community bound by international obligations that flow
from commonly-shared values and interests. One model more
applicable to the contemporary international system-the civitas
maxima--derives from Roman law experience. This is a concept that
reflects the existence of a higher body politic, and in the Roman legal
system, it included the different nations and tribes that comprised the
Empire. But it was the collective belief in the existence of this
intangible whole that was greater than its parts-the civitas
maxima-that engendered a collective social bond from which
emanated duties that transcended the interests of the singular. The
moral or ethical ligament and the pragmatic and experiential bonds
thus coalesced in the civitas maxima. From that whole, legal
obligations arose that the community had to enforce individually and
collectively, for the benefit of all.
Against this vision stands the Hobbesian state of nature, in which
each state pursues its own interests, defines its own goals, follows its
own path, relies on its own means, and is limited only by its own
considerations of expediency and whatever is prudent to achieve its
goals. This includes the ability of a state to free itself from any moral
or ethical limitations, even when these considerations represent its
own society's commonly-shared values. Thus, no moral or ethical
rules restrain states in their relations with one another, except those
rules to which they voluntarily submit, including self-restraining
limitations arising from countervailing deterring forces. More
significantly, the state could opt out of its previously voluntarily
accepted obligations without any other consequences than those that
countervailing forces could exercise. The Hobbesian state, subject to
its own considerations of enlightenment, expediency, and prudence,
is essentially self-controlling. To a large extent, this quality is
reflected in the Westphalian model of 1648 which, though without its
original vigor, has managed to survive even in the present age of
global interdependence. Philosophers from Aristotle to Rousseau do
not set aside morality and responsibility of states as some
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philosophers,
These
do.
political realists
contemporary
and
morality
consider
views,
notwithstanding their different
responsibility as components of state decision-making. The Kantian
methodology of pure reason, which has influenced many modem
philosophers and political scientists, co-exists with the metaphysical
elements of ethics. Both are part of the rules controlling interpersonal and inter-social relations.
A modem civitas maxima model includes self- and externallyimposed limitations. But a process must guide such a model, lest it
turn into a form of a collective Hobbesian state of nature where the
powerful and wealthy nations dominate the community's collective
processes and arrogate to themselves the prerogative of
exceptionalism. The modem civitas maxima must therefore be
subject to the international rule of law, which includes both binding
legal norms that transcend domestic norms as well as legal processes
that are similar to national legal processes. These legal processes
have the capacity for "direct enforcement" through mechanisms such
as international judicial institutions as a complementary approach to
"indirect enforcement," which is achieved through the intermediation
of state enforcement in accordance with its domestic legal system.
More importantly, the modern civitas maxima must be founded on
legitimacy and its acts must also conform to legal legitimacy. Such
legal legitimacy cannot rest on the sole assertion of state interest, but
it must be based on the right reason. This right reason is not
necessarily the same notion of "right reason" that Aristotle advocated
in his natural law conception. Legal legitimacy is the right reason
premised on existing positive norms, though not excluding the
application of higher norms derived in part from the commonlyshared values of the times, and enduring values represented in
general principles of law. Such an approach regulating international
relations is likely to better govern these relations and produce better
outcomes, which is the ultimate utilitarian reward for compliance
with the norms and processes of the international legal system. Legal
legitimacy reduces the latitude of relativism that undermines the
certainty of the law and eliminates the predictability and consistency
of legal outcomes. Without legal legitimacy in state and collective
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state action, the international legal system will have no predictable
and consistent outcomes. Worse yet, it will have little chance of
uniform voluntary compliance.
Rules governing interstate and international relations must be
flexible because they are subject to interpretation within context.
These rules are also likely to respond or succumb to both
countervailing considerations of different state interests and power
relations. Without that flexibility, states would not assent to a system
that requires compliance with collective rules absent the
countervailing benefits of an international social contract
la
Rousseau. The basic quid pro quo that may exist in a national
community does not have the same counterpart in the international
community, for no other reason than no one can entirely redress the
imbalance of power and wealth among the members of that
community. To the contrary, in the international community, the
unilateral quest for power and accumulation of wealth continues to be
one of the avowed goals. Thus, the international community has yet
to accept what the French philosopher Pascal urged: "In times of
peace nations must do to each other the most good, and in times of
war, the least harm." To achieve this lofty goal, nations must enter
into an international social contract that includes the obligation to
protect, some basis for wealth-sharing, and the transfer of technology
and knowledge from developed to developing countries. Thus,
existing notions of collective security in the Westphalian context
must yield to a new international collective responsibility to protect.
Similarly, the international social contract must embrace an equitable
system of sharing world resources and transferring technology and
knowledge. In short, protection, resource-sharing, and international
criminal justice must be part of the new world social contract in the
age of globalization.
Modern political realism reflects the disjunctive and contradictory
forces that exist in international intercourse. These forces make it
implausible to accept the existence of binding rules capable of
restraining states in their conduct by means other than power.
Political realists view the international system as an arena in which a
Hobbesian state of nature controls the behavior of states without
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externally imposed limitations. Accordingly, international law has
been based on a concept of equal sovereignty of states and voluntary
acceptance of international obligations with no external coercion or
enforcement and no intervention in the domestic affairs of any state,
save for the United Nations collective security system as determined
on an ad hoc basis by the Security Council. This paradigm implicitly
accepts the inequities of power relations whereby the stronger can
impose their will on the weaker. Such a model contradicts an
international legal order based on the rule of law, which brooks no
double standards.
Political realists, particularly those of the school of realpolitik,
assume that the relations between nations are in a constant anarchic
state of change because they reflect an ongoing power struggle
restrained only by countervailing power. However, in the age of
globalization, when so much interdependence exists, multilateral
interests have, by their own force, bound unilateral power. The
analogy is to the giant Gulliver who represents the unbridled power
of political realism at its best and the Hobbesian state of nature. But
in the age of globalization, many large and small strings that
represent in part the commonly-shared values and multiple interests
of the international community tie Gulliver down. These strings
cumulatively represent the multilateral that has tamed the power of
the giant unilateral. Admittedly, the giant is not entirely tamed, and
should he want to, he could break away from all or many of his
bonds, unless of course he finds it of greater interest to remain bound,
or he is further restrained.
The age of globalization has increased the incentives for the giant
of unilateralism to remain bound, just as it has increased its
disincentives to break away from the agreed multilateral system of
norms and legal processes. Presently, globalization is viewed as
involving communications, commerce, finance, and only in part,
collective security. However, it still does not include the collective
duty to protect, wealth-sharing, or international criminal justice. So
far, globalization has not ripened into an international social contract,
and it only represents a small portion of the commonly-shared values
and interests of the international community. Indeed, there is only
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some evidence that globalization includes the duty of international
criminal accountability.
Multilateral problem-solving and collective decision-making by
international institutions with rulemaking authority that transcends
the powers of member states exemplify the changes that have
occurred during the past decades. Many international organizations
and the mechanisms of collective decision-making they embody have
brought about a new reality of international governance without the
need for world government. Moreover, the web of multilateral and
bilateral agreements containing cooperative obligations, coupled with
enforcement mechanisms that include sanctions, has created
interlocking relationships between states. These relationships, in turn,
have enhanced the acceptance of external obligations while
simultaneously nurturing confidence among states that the
relinquishment of individual decision-making is not without
concomitant
benefits.
Experience
has demonstrated
that
multilateralism, notwithstanding its weaknesses and shortcomings,
accomplishes more than unilateralism can. What is lost in unilateral
freedom of action is compensated by what is gained from collective
decision-making and collective as well as cooperative action.
To paraphrase Myres McDougal's position in the 1960s, he framed
international relations by a web of constitutive processes of
multilateral authoritative decision-making. The pervasive effect of
this world constitutive process cannot be solely applied to matters of
economic interests because what brought about this elaborate process
was an array of values and policies that include human values. As a
consequence, it is now well-established that the individual is a
subject of international law, though not in all the same respects as
states and international organizations. But today, surely no one will
deny that the individual, as a subject of international law, is the
beneficiary of rights arising under international law, even when the
recognition of these rights derives from the will of states. These
individual rights derive from the traditional notion of third party
beneficiary under traditional treaty law, which is evidenced in
multilateral and bilateral treaty provisions intended to make the
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individual a beneficiary of these legal rights with standing to have
states and international institutions uphold them.
The recognition of the individual as a subject of law and the
establishment of treaty rights inuring to his benefit imply that the
international community as a whole, states individually and
collectively, and international organizations have the duty to protect
these human rights. This duty to protect is binding upon states insofar
as they have assumed specific treaty obligations as well as by nontreaty obligations arising from the peremptory norms of international
law, referred to as jus cogens. The latter imply certain collective
obligation by the international community to for example prevent
genocide, to criminally pursue its perpetrators and to compensate its
victims. Many, including this writer, argue that this postulate extends
to other international crimes such as: crimes against humanity, war
crimes, torture, slavery and slave-related practices and international
trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation, as well as
certain forms of terrorism.
Legal experience demonstrates that the enunciation of rights
without concomitant remedies is a pyrrhic pronouncement and that
remedies without enforcement are empty promises. However morally
compelling these arguments about individual human rights and their
enforceability may be, it remains necessary to induce states to
recognize and enforce such rights. The need for such an inducement
arises because outcomes from an international legal system based on
the rule of law are likely to be detrimental to state interests and may
limit the waning Westphalian concept of state sovereignty. Therefore,
the inducement must be correlated to state interests. The argument
supporting this proposition is that protecting individual and collective
human rights enhances peace and security; reduces domestic,
regional, and world disruptions; and is ultimately more economical
than having to engage after the fact in military intervention. In other
words, the argument for the duty to protect advances the utilitarian
side of human rights with respect to its impact on state interests.
While there has never been empiric verification of this proposed
argument, common sense reveals that the human and economic costs
that the international community has incurred since the end of WWII,
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which heralded the United Nations Security Council system of
collective security, have by far outweighed the costs that the world
would have incurred if that failed Security Council system had been
transformed into an effective international system to protect human
rights. While this may sound anathema to political realists intent on
ignoring their own realism in assessing the economic costs of
conflicts, let alone the human costs, of advancing the proposition of a
duty to protect is predicated as humanistic and pragmatic
considerations.
As an illustration, it is noteworthy that between 1948 and 1998,
there have been approximately 250 conflicts whose estimated number
of victims range from 70 million at the low end to 170 million at the
high end. These conflicts fall into the following arbitrary legal
categories: conflicts of an international character, conflicts of a noninternational character, internal conflicts, and tyrannical regime
victimization. No matter the conflict's label or legal characterization,
they contain the same human interests and prohibitions in
international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and in
the domestic law of most legal systems. The fact that the same
protections overlap is also indicative of diversity in the enforcement
mechanisms and remedies for the violation of these rights. Such
overlapping legal regimes ultimately necessitate a choice of law that
frequently results in the non-applicability of any one of them. In other
words, such overlaps also produce gaps, particularly with respect to
international criminal justice. Aside from the problems of multiple
legal regimes applying to the same protected social interest, an
enforcement disparity exists even though each one of these legal
regimes is predicated on the same values and aimed at achieving the
same goals. In turn, this disparity impacts the international
community's perception of its obligation to protect and thus prevent
human harm, including by means of international criminal
accountability.
As stated above, during the period between 1948 and 1998, and
throughout the 250 various conflicts, the estimated number of
casualties resulting ranges from a minimum of 70 million to a
maximum of 170 million persons. The low end of the estimate
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represents twice the number of the victims of World War I (WWI)
and WWII combined. Yet with only a few exceptions during the
course of this long strand of worldwide human tragedies, there has
been little evidence of the existence of an international duty to
prevent these harms or a duty to provide for international criminal
accountability. The international collective security system of the
Security Council seldom has been invoked effectively to protect
individuals and collectivities from death, human suffering, and other
human depredations. In nearly all of these cases, an injudicious
political realism has prevailed, even in the face of ample early
warnings and unfolding stark realities revealed by conflicts.
The history of international criminal justice started with the 1447
Breisach trial, where 26 judges of the Holy Roman Empire sat in
judgment over the case of Peter Von Hagenbach, who committed
"crimes against the laws of nature and God" in the sacking and
pillaging of the city of Breisach. Although Von Hagenbach acted on
the orders of the Duke of Burgundy (to whom Breisach had been
given by the Holy Roman Empire for his services to the Empire) the
court precluded him from raising the defense of "obedience to
superior orders." The reason was that the Empire did not want one of
its sovereigns held accountable for such crimes. Thus, political
considerations prevailed over justice. Von Hagenbach was drawn and
quartered, and the Duke of Burgundy benefited from impunity.
It was not until 1918 that the victorious allies, in the treaty of
Versailles that ended WWI, announced their intentions to prosecute
Kaiser Wilhem II of Hohenzollern for the "Supreme Offense against
the sanctity of treaties" under Article 227 of that treaty. But the
Kaiser sought and obtained asylum in the Netherlands because
Article 227 did not reflect the existence of a recognized international
crime. The Allies wanted to assuage world public opinion for the 20
million victims of that war, but they certainly did not intend to
prosecute a royal monarch when most of Europe's heads of state
were monarchs. In fact, many of Europe's monarchs were related to
the Kaiser as descendents of Queen Victoria. Once again, politics
prevailed over justice.
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The same treaty, in Articles 228-229, provided for the prosecution
of those Germans who had committed war crimes. While on its face
this was a double standard because it excluded prosecution for similar
war crimes by the Allies, the prosecution of German war criminals
never took place. The Allies established a Commission to investigate
the responsibility of the authors of the war and its conduct, and the
Commission concluded that they should prosecute some 19,000
Germans. In time, that number dwindled to 895. By 1923, the Allies
had abandoned their lofty goals of international prosecution. Instead,
they agreed to have Germany take over that task of prosecution under
German law. The German Supreme Court sitting in Leipzig agreed to
prosecute 45 of the 895 but only tried 22. The stiffest sentence
imposed was three years imprisonment for a U-boat officer who
committed the crime of sinking a hospital ship with over 600
wounded. This time, even though politics prevailed, justice was
symbolic, and that in itself constituted progress.
However, for obvious political reasons, the Allies also decided to
forego the prosecution of Turkish officials for the 1915 massacre of a
then estimated 200,000 Armenian civilians. In time, that estimate
grew to one million Armenian victims. Regardless of the total
number of victims, politics prevailed, and there was no accountability
for this crime. Notably, the 1919 Commission mentioned above,
recommended the prosecution of Turkish officials for "crimes against
the laws of humanity." Even though the preamble of the 1909 Hague
Convention on the Regulation of Armed Conflicts contained this
term, the United States and Japan vigorously opposed the
recommendation, and accordingly, no one carried it out. The reason
was that in 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution had taken over Russia,
turning it into what became known as the U.S.S.R., and the Western
Allies wanted Turkey on their side to face the new threat of
communism. Once again, realpolitik prevailed. The Treaty of Sevres
did not require Turkey to prosecute any Turkish officials for the
massacre of the Armenians.
Some report this tragic episode, although with questionable
historical accuracy, led Adolf Hitler to tell his officers in 1939, on the
eve of their aggression against Czechoslovakia and Poland, "and who
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now remembers the Armenians?" Presumably, the senior officers of
the German Wehrmacht had qualms about engaging in aggression
and the ensuing killing of civilians in these first countries that fell
victim to Nazi aggression. Thus, Hitler reminded them that impunity
is the rule because politics prevail over justice in international affairs.
In 1942, the Allies started to contemplate the prosecution of
Germans for aggression, war crimes, and what later became known in
the Nuremberg Charter as "crimes against humanity." In 1943, the
Allies, in the Moscow Declaration, affirmed their intentions to
prosecute the Axis powers for war crimes. In 1945, the four major
Allies in the European theater started to draft the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal (IMT), whose seat became
Nuremberg. On August 6, 1945, the four major Allies signed a treaty
establishing the IMT, which ultimately prosecuted 22 major war
criminals. The three crimes included were crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. The charge of crimes against
peace was reminiscent of the Allies' failed effort to prosecute the
Kaiser under Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty. Crimes against
humanity was the counterpart to the failed effort of the 1919
Commission to prosecute Turkish officials for what was then called
crimes against the laws of humanity. Thus, international criminal
justice in 1945 built upon the failures of the post-WWI experience.
Control Council Order No. 10 followed the IMT prosecutions,
which the four major Allies adopted, exercising sovereignty over
Germany to prosecute German violators of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Each of the four Allies in their respective zones of
occupation undertook the equivalent of national prosecutions based
on international law.
Almost contemporaneously, the Allies in the Far East, who
differed from those in the European theater, proceeded to prosecute
the defeated Japanese. The International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (IMTFE), unlike its counterpart, the IMT, was not established by
a treaty. Instead, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied
Commander for the Far East, promulgated an order. The United
States did not want to give the U.S.S.R. a role in these proceedings
because the latter joined the war against Japan only three weeks
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before its defeat. More significantly, the United States did not want
the U.S.S.R. to have political influence in post-war Japan. Thus,
politics had an impact on the way that international criminal justice
proceeded in that part of the world.
Even though the Allies modeled the IMTFE Charter after the IMT
and thus included crimes against peace, MacArthur had more concern
about governing Japan than prosecuting Japanese Emperor Hirohito.
Japan's head of state thus escaped responsibility for allowing his
country to enter the war on the side of Germany and for attacking the
United States at Pearl Harbor in violation of the existing laws and
customs of war. Members of Hirohito's family also avoided
prosecution, particularly for the horrendous crime that Japanese
forces committed in the Chinese city of Nanjing, where Japanese
forces killed an estimated 250,000 civilians and raped a large number
of women. Japanese forces committed those crimes at the direction of
the Japanese Emperor's uncle. Thus, political reasons had an impact
in this and in many other ways on the Tokyo war crimes proceedings.
Subsequently, the Allies in the Far East conducted criminal
prosecutions of Japanese prisoners. One such trial occurred in the
Philippines, where General MacArthur established a military
commission to prosecute Japanese General Yamashita. The
commission charged him for crimes that Japanese forces committed
nominally under his command but over whom he had no control and
about whose actions he had no knowledge. The five general officers
of the Yamashita military commission were non-lawyers under the
command of General MacArthur. They found Yamashita guilty on
the grounds that "he should have known." Never before nor after has
anyone applied this standard of command responsibility. But General
MacArthur, who had previously been in command of the Philippines
and who had to escape the island Corregidor, leaving his troops
behind, wanted to make an example of a Japanese General. Thus,
political as well as personal considerations prevailed over justice in
this case. In 1946, the United States Supreme Court reviewed this
case in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), and refused to grant
habeas corpus. But the dissent of two Justices, Murphy and Rutledge,
will remain in the annals of legal history as beacons of opposition to
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injustice. Since then, the legal standard of command responsibility
applied to General Yamashita was never applied again.
Unlike prosecutions in Germany that continued for years by the
Federal Republic of Germany after the IMT and prosecutions under
Control Council Order No. 10 concluded, there were no prosecutions
in Japan after 1951. By 1953, all of those convicted in the Far East
who had not been sentenced to death and executed were brought to a
central prison in Tokyo and released. By 1954, two of the major war
criminals convicted by the IMTFE became cabinet members. To date,
the government of Japan refuses to acknowledge its responsibility for
the crimes its troops committed in China, Korea, and the Philippines.
Moreover, Japan refuses to acknowledge responsibility for what is
euphemistically called the Korean "comfort women"-some 300,000
women kidnapped from Korea and held in brothels in sexual bondage
for the benefit of Japanese forces.
The post-WWII prosecutions were essentially for the defeated,
leading many commentators to call these prosecutions "victors'
justice." No member of the Allied forces was ever prosecuted for a
war crime. No one raised the issue of war crimes or crimes against
humanity for the deliberate bombing of non-military targets such as
the city of Dresden, which had no military value, and which resulted
in the killing of 35,000 civilians. To date, not much question was
raised about the atomic bombings of the civilian cities of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, which resulted in an estimated 250,000 victims who
died of the attack, countless others who died after the attack from
atomic radiation, and those who suffered from it and survived. Harry
Truman personally sanctioned the latter, while Winston Churchill
personally sanctioned the former. For Dresden, it was retaliation over
the German bombings of Coventry and other civilian targets in
England at the beginning of the war. But retaliation, as well as other
forms of reprisals against protected targets such as innocent civilians,
is impermissible under the law of armed conflict. The atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were also in violation of the
laws of armed conflict, but they were motivated by the desire to bring
the war to an end, and thus to save American lives, even at the cost of
taking Japanese civilian lives and notwithstanding a clear violation of

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:541

the laws of armed conflict. In war and peace, the lives of some have
tragically and regrettably always been valued more than that of the
lives of others. Why else did the international community not
intervene to protect the lives of those who were so helplessly and
tragically slaughtered in Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and
Liberia, to name only a few as the contemporary egregious crimes of
the past few decades.
Soon after WWII, the Cold War began, and efforts to advance
international criminal justice gave way to the political conflict
between the East and the West. The United Nations' efforts to
establish an international criminal court and develop a Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind continued, but
without a successful outcome. Politics once again prevailed over
efforts to advance international criminal justice. A succession of
committees and commissions worked to draft a statute for an
international criminal court and to elaborate an international criminal
code, but to no avail. Political realities of the time thwarted these
efforts, leaving no room for the progress of international criminal
justice.
The efforts to define "aggression," the term used to replace
"crimes against peace" used in the IMT and IMTFE Charters, took 22
years. The process resulted in a General Assembly consensus
resolution, but not a treaty. The major powers did not want
aggression defined in a binding treaty because they saw themselves
locked in a cold war that might lead to hot wars, as was the case with
the Korean conflict in 1953. The realities of major powers' politics
once again thwarted the pursuit of international criminal justice.
It was not until 1987 that the International Law Commission
seriously resumed the project of establishing a draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, but that effort was shortlived. There was not much progress for international criminal justice
until 1992 when the Security Council established a Commission of
Experts to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law
in the former Yugoslavia. While the Commission received the
broadest mandate since Nuremberg, it was not given the resources or
political support to do its work. Nevertheless, it was able to
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circumvent these difficulties, and the evidence it accumulated led the
Security Council in 1994 to establish the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As a result, the former
head of state of Serbia, Slobodan Milosovic, was brought to the bar
of justice before the ICTY in The Hague. Shortly after the Security
Council established the ICTY, it established the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). After some difficulties in
start-up, that tribunal proceeded to prosecute a number of persons,
including the former head of state of the Hutu government in Rwanda
during that conflict.
The ICTY and ICTR became landmarks in international criminal
justice. Their accomplishments helped pave the way for the
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 1998
Treaty of Rome. But the ICC has suffered since then from the
opposition of the United States-an opposition that is essentially
politically motivated. The Bush Administration came into power after
the Treaty of Rome, intent upon unilateral military intervention based
on whatever it deemed to be in the national interest. The
Administration did not want to see members of its government and
senior members of the military prosecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity should these occur in the context of any foreign
military intervention.
Critics of the ICTY and ICTR raise questions about the slowness
of the proceedings and their costs. While these concerns are valid, it
is difficult to quantify the cost of international criminal justice,
particularly when it is merely starting up. Moreover, it is difficult to
quantify the value of due process in the exemplary manner in which
these tribunals have proceeded, for they have shown the world how a
system of international criminal justice, and for that matter, how
domestic systems of justice should proceed. The symbolism of these
tribunals and the examples they have set, costs and delays
notwithstanding, demonstrate the extraordinary value of international
criminal justice. Many lessons have been learned that informed the
drafting of the ICC statute and that will inform its jurisprudence.
Many other lessons could have been learned to improve the
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dissemination of knowledge of these tribunals' work in order to
inform victims that justice has been served.
The ICC is encumbered with the opposition of the United States as
well as its efforts to prevent other states from fully cooperating with
the ICC. But so far, the United States has not succeeded. The
Security Council's resolution to refer the Darfur, Sudan situation to
the ICC, with the implicit acquiescence of the United States, is an
important step in furtherance of international criminal justice.
However, its outcome is yet to be assessed.
Against this background, one must remember the many conflicts in
which post-conflict justice has been sacrificed to politics. In the
conflicts mentioned above, there has been much impunity and little
accountability. Suffice it to recall that in Biafra in the early 1960s,
Bangladesh in the early 1970s, and Cambodia between 1975 and
1985, the estimated number of victims in each of these conflicts
exceeded one million, with possibly up to two million in Cambodia.
None of the major perpetrators have ever been brought to justice, nor
have any of the minor perpetrators for that matter. Other conflicts in
different parts of the world have also resulted in either total or
substantial impunity.
As each of these conflicts empties its horrors before the conscience
of humanity, there is a growing demand for post-conflict justice by
international civil society and a number of concerned governments.
The United Nations has been at the forefront of trying to advance
international criminal justice, but in the end, the United Nations can
only do what the major powers expect it to do. The United Nations'
noteworthy efforts include: the 2005 World Summit Outcome report,
the 2005 Millennium Development Goals report, the 2004 Report by
the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, the 2000 Report of the Panel on
United Nations Peace Operations, various reports by Special
Rapporteurs on human rights and accountability, and lastly, the
adoption by the General Assembly in March 2006 of the Basic
Principlesand Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of InternationalHuman Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International HumanitarianLaw, which
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includes the duty to investigate and prosecute international crimes.
These and other efforts, as well as national post-conflict justice
experiences, evidence the need to develop a range of accountability
measures to prevent impunity and to ensure the existence of
international criminal justice, not only as a way to punish the
perpetrators, but as a way of preventing the commission of future
crimes.
As stated above, the interdependence of the international
community in the age of globalization requires a duty to protect as a
means to prevent the occurrence of international crimes such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, slavery and
slave-related practices, and trafficking in women and children for
sexual exploitation. These and other crimes such as terrorism require,
in addition to international cooperation, an international system of
criminal justice. The system need not be supra-national, nor should
international institutions prevail over national ones. The ICC's model
based on complementarity between national and international
systems should be reinforced. This reinforcement requires developing
capacity-building for national justice systems and examining other
alternatives, such as mixed tribunals, as in the case of Sierra Leone.
Without national capacity-building, the international community will
have situations such as Afghanistan where there is no accountability
for war crimes or crimes against humanity committed over a 30-year
period of conflict. Surely without capacity-building, the international
community will face the failure evidenced in the Iraqi prosecutions of
Saddam Hussein and the leaders of the Ba'ath Regime.
International criminal justice requires a comprehensive and
integrated approach that relies on the complementarity of
international and national systems of justice, but it must especially
rely on effective international cooperation in combating international
crimes. The precondition for this approach is the removal of politics
from international criminal justice.
All member states of the United Nations should unequivocally
renounce impunity for international crimes, particularly those
mentioned above. They should not allow governments to give
impunity to heads of states or senior perpetrators of genocide, crimes
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against humanity, and war crimes. Furthermore, international civil
society should not tolerate governments who do so. Otherwise, as
George Santayana said, "Those who do not learn the lessons of the
past are doomed to repeat them."

